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Case No. 20090015-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
CHANCE L. ROBINSON,
Defendant/ Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from his conviction for possession or use of
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 5837-8(2)(a) (i) (West Supp. 2009).l This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008).2

1

The Utah Controlled Substances Act has been amended since the date
the offenses were committed. Those amendments, however, did not affect the
substance of those provisions of the Act at issue in this case. Accordingly, the
State cites to the most recent version of the statute.
2

Defendant does not challenge his conviction for driving with a
measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-517(2) (West Supp. 2006). See Aplt. Brf. at 4
n.l.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it unlawful for a person to
"knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled
substance in [his or her] body/7 Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i); § 58-372(l)(c),(ii) (WestSupp. 2006).
Is this offense unconstitutional under the federal and state
constitutions?
Standard of Review. A challenge to the constitutionality of a statute is a
question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v. Gallegos, 2009 UT 42, \ 10,
P.3d_.
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann, § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2006)
It is unlawful... for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (West Supp 2009)
"k -k "k

(c) "Consumption" means ingesting or having any measurable
amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but this
Subsection (l)(c) does not include the metabolite of a controlled
substance.
* **

(ii) "Possession" or "use" means the... application, inhalation,
swallowing, injection, or consumption... of controlled substances

-?-

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant was charged with (1) possession or use of heroine in a drugfree zone; (2) possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone; (3) driving
under the influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI); and (4) possession or use of
methamphetamine in a drug-free zone. R. 4-3, 50-48. Defendant moved to
quash the bindover order of the methamphetamine charge. R. 73-58. In his
motion, Defendant argued that the provisions of the Utah Controlled Substances
Act making it unlawful to have any measurable amount of a controlled
substance in a person's body violate both the federal and state constitutions. R.
73-58. The trial court denied the motion. R. 102-98.
Under a plea agreement, Defendant pled guilty to possession or use of
methamphetamine, reduced to a third degree felony, and an amended charge of
driving with a measureable controlled substance in the body, a class B
misdemeanor. R. 112-04. The remaining charges were dismissed. R.108.
Defendant reserved his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to
quash the possession offense. R. 108. The trial court sentenced Defendant to an
indeterminate prison term of zero-to-five years and a concurrent jail sentence of
180 days. R. 121-20. The court suspended the sentences, placed Defendant on
supervised probation, and ordered that he serve 210 days in jail. R. 121-18.
Defendant timely appealed. R. 124-23.

-3-

STATEMENT OF FACTS3
At approximately 9:00 p.m. on August 10, 2007, Lehi City Officer
Ellswood initiated a traffic stop of Defendant on suspicion of driving without
insurance. R. 133:5-6,15. After Officer Ellswood observed that Defendant was
exhibiting signs of impairment, he asked backup Officer Alma Owens, a
certified drug recognition expert, to investigate Defendant for driving under the
influence of alcohol or drugs (DUI). R. 133: 7, 12-13. In speaking with
Defendant, Officer Owens "observed that [Defendant's] eyes were bloodshot
and glassy and [that] he was having a hard time speaking" to Officer Owens. R.
133: 8. Suspecting alcohol or drug impairment, Officer Owens administered
field sobriety tests to Defendant. R. 133:8,13. When Defendant failed the tests,
Officer Owens arrested him for DUI and placed him in the patrol vehicle. R.
133: 9-10.
Following Defendant's arrest, officers asked his two passengers to exit the
vehicle so police could perform a search of the car incident to arrest. R. 133: 9,
When the front seat passenger exited, a syringe fell from his lap or pants. R. 133:
21-22, During the search of the car, officers found another syringe underneath
the backseat of the car. R. 133: 22. And between the two front seats of the car,

Because there was no trial, the facts are taken from the preliminary
hearing.
-4-

officers found a black bag that contained an iPod, two fifty-dollar bills, and a
third syringe that later tested positive for heroin. R. 133: 9, 18-19. At some
point, Defendant claimed as his the iPod and money found in the black bag. R.
133: 9,19-21.
At the police station, Defendant submitted to breath, urine, and blood
tests. R. 133:10,14. In response to preliminary questions before the tests were
administered, Defendant admitted to using heroin earlier that day, "12 hours
ago." R. 133:17-18, 24. None of the tests detected the presence of alcohol. R.
133:14-15. The urinalysis "showed positive for cocaine and benzodiazepine."
R. 133:15. The blood analysis also showed positive for methamphetamine. See
R. 133:10; R. 134: 4-5, 8.

-5-

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under Utah law, a person may not "knowingly and intentionally" possess
or use a controlled substance without a valid prescription. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 58-37-8(2)(a) (West Supp. 2009). Possession or use includes the consumption
of a drug, which includes not only //ingesting// the drug, but also "having any
measurable amount of [the drug] in a person's body." Utah Code Ann. § 58-372(1)(c) (West Supp. 2009). The provision does not, therefore, criminalize
unknowing, unintentional, or involuntary conduct. A person is guilty of the
measurable amount offense only if he or she "knowingly and intentionally" has
a measurable amount of a controlled substance in the body.
This offense is a single, "continuing" offense, like any other possession
crime. Although prosecution may be pursued in any county where possession
is established, the defendant is not subject to multiple prosecutions for that
continuing offense unless it can be shown that the defendant possessed or used
discretely two or more quantities of a drug.
The measurable amount offense is not an unconstitutional status offense
under Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). The California addiction
provision made it a crime to be addicted to narcotics, whether or not the person
had ever used a narcotic. In other words, the addiction provision criminalized
the mere propensity or desire to use narcotics. In contrast, Utah's measurable

amount provision criminalizes the actual use of narcotics. Indeed, circulation of
the drug in the body is the quintessential use of a drug—the phase of use where
the drug actually affects bodily processes. As long as the drug remains active in
the body, a user is subject to prosecution, just as the possessor is subject to
prosecution for possession as long as he retains or holds the drug. The fact that
a defendant can do nothing to reverse the effect of use while it is ongoing does
not render it unconstitutional.
This Court should also reject Defendant's state constitutional claims.
Defendant's state due process claim is inadequately briefed and this Court
should not, therefore, address it. Defendant's uniform operation of laws claim
lacks merit. The alleged fact that marijuana remains in a person's system longer
than more serious drugs, like methamphetamine or cocaine, does not create an
unconstitutional classification. So long as a person is under the influence of a
drug, it is reasonable for the Legislature to criminalize the conduct.
Finally, evidence at the preliminary hearing that Defendant tested
positive for both cocaine and methamphetamine, that he had among his
belongings a syringe that tested positive for heroin, that he admitted to using
heroin earlier that day, and that his companions also had syringes was sufficient
to support a reasonable belief that Defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed or used the methamphetamine.

-7-

ARGUMENT
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY BOUND OVER FOR
KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY HAVING A
MEASURABLE AMOUNT OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
IN HIS BODY
After testing positive for methamphetamine, Defendant was charged with
the possession or use of a controlled substance pursuant to the provision
defining consumption as "having any measurable amount of a controlled
substance in [the] body." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(c), (ii) (WestSupp. 2006).
In a motion to quash the bindover on that charge, Defendant argued that the
measurable amount provision is an unconstitutional status offense under United
States v. Robinson; 370 U.S. 660 (1962), and also violates the Utah Constitution. R.
73-59. The trial court rejected Defendant's argument. See R. 102-99 (Addendum
B). This Court should affirm.
A. Utah's "measurable amount" provision is a continuing offense
that requires "knowing and intentional" conduct.
Defendant's constitutional challenges to the measurable amount provision
rest, in large part, on his interpretation of that provision. For example, he
asserts that the provision exposes a person to criminal liability for accidental,
unintentional, or otherwise involuntary use of a drug, contrary to due process
and the principles laid out in Robinson. Aplt. Brf, at 14-16. He also asserts that
because controlled substances remain in the body for extended periods of time,

-8-

the provision subjects a user who travels across multiple counties to "multiple
prosecutions and convictions/7 and thus multiple, and perhaps increasing,
punishments. Aplt. Brf. at 8-9, 14. He suggests that such an "outrageous
scenario" violates guarantees against double jeopardy. See Aplt. Brf. at 8-9,14.
The failure to impose a scienter requirement does not necessarily render a
criminal statute unconstitutional. See Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228
(1957) (observing that the legislative authority to define an offense includes the
power "to exclude elements of knowledge and diligence from its definition").
Moreover, a legislature is not constitutionally barred from defining as separate
offenses that which might be viewed as a single course of conduct. See Sanabria
v. United States, 437 U.S. 54,69-70 (1978) (recognizing that the Double Jeopardy
Clause does not limit the legislative power to determine "[w]hether a particular
course of conduct involves one or more distinct 'offenses7 under the statute").
This Court need not, however, reach these issues, because the measurable
amount provision does not expose a person to criminal liability for
unintentional or involuntary conduct, nor does it subject a person to multiple
prosecutions for the single, continuing use or possession of a drug.
***

In interpreting a statute, this Court "seek[s] 'to give effect to the intent of
the legislature in light of the purpose the statute was meant to achieve/"

-Q-

Housekeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, % 21,197 P.3d 636 (quoting Harmon City, Inc. v.
Nielsen & Senior, 907 P.2d 1162, 1167 (Utah 1995)). In doing so, the Court
" 'look[s] first to the statute's plain language/ " read as a whole. State v. Moreno,
2009 UT 15,1f 10, 203 P.3d 1000 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, If 7,162 P.3d
1099).

The Court also construes the language "'in harmony with other

provisions in the same statute and with other statutes under the same and
related chapters/77 Id. (quoting Sill, 2007 UT 45, f 7). Where possible, the Court
is likewise "obligated to avoid interpretations that conflict with relevant
constitutional mandates/" Id. (quoting State v. Mooney, 2004 UT 49, | 12, 98
P.3d 420). When construed under the foregoing rules of statutory construction,
the measurable amount provision does not suffer from any of the perceived
infirmities alleged by Defendant.
1. The measurable amount provision requires a showing that
the defendant "knowingly and intentionally" had a
measurable amount of a controlled substance in the body.
The Utah Controlled Substances Act makes it "unlawful .. . for any
person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance
analog or a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid
prescription or order.. .." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2009)
(emphasis added). The Act defines "possession" or "use" as including the
"consumption . . . of controlled substances." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii)
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(West Supp 2009). "[Consumption," in turn, occurs by either "ingesting or
having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body." Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(ii) (West Supp 2009) (emphasis added). Thus, when
read as a whole, these provisions of the Act make it unlawful for any person to
"knowingly and intentionally" have "any measurable amount of a controlled
substance in [the] body," unless obtained under a valid prescription.
In sum, the statute does not "impose punishment for something that [the
State] has not proven was a voluntary act by the defendant," as argued by
Defendant. Aplt. Brf. at 14. Under the statute's plain language, a violation
occurs only if the person "knowingly and intentionally" has a measurable
controlled substance in his or her body.
2. The measurable amount provision is a "continuing" offense
subject to a single prosecution.
Nor does the measurable amount provision subject a person to "multiple
prosecutions [or punishments] for what is actually only one crime," as argued
by Defendant. Aplt. Brf. at 9,14. Defendant contends that under the statute, a
person who ingests a drug even once is "subject to repeated prosecution" and
punishment until the substance leaves the body. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17, 8-9 & n.2.
Defendant thus assumes that the "unit of prosecution" for the measurable
amount offense is each moment the drug is in the body. But under Defendant's
reading of the statute, the same could be said of possession by the holding or
-11-

carrying of a drug on one's person—he or she would be guilty of a separate
offense for every moment of unlawful possession. Defendant's interpretation of
the statute is erroneous.
The Utah Supreme Court long ago held that "[t]he possession of narcotic
drugs . . . is a continuing [offense]/' State v. Jasso, 21 Utah 2d 24, 439 P.2d 844,
849 (1968), and thus lasts as long as the act of possession or use does. In other
words, it is one "continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single
impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may
occupy." United States v. Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S, 161, 166 (1939).
Possession offenses are universally treated as continuing offenses. See, e.g.,
Jordan v. Virginia, 653 F.2d 870,875 (4th Cir. 1980) (holding that "[possession is
by nature a continuing offense"), abrogated on other grounds in United States v.
Williams, 155 F.3d 418,421 (4th Cir. 1998); People v. Bland, 898 P.2d 391,396 (Cal.
1995) (holding that "[djrug possession is . . . a continuing offense, one that
extends through time"); Fulcher v. Commonwealth, 149 S.W.3d 363,376 (Ky.2004)
(holding that "uninterrupted possession of the same contraband over a period of
time is but one offense constituting a continuing course of conduct"); Anderson v.
State, 867 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Md. 2005) (holding that "the uninterrupted
possession of an item of contraband is ordinarily regarded as one continuing
offense"); People v. Carvajal, 845 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (N.Y. 2005) (holding that

"unlawful possession is a continuing offense"); State v. Zele, 716 A.2d 833, 837
(Vt. 1998) (holding that marijuana possession is a continuing offense).
The measurable amount alternative for possession or use is no different
than any other alternative of possession or use —it is a continuing offense.
Possession or use by having any measurable controlled substance in the body is
"set on foot by a single impulse" — the inhalation, ingestion, injection, or
application of the drug—and is "operated by an unintermittent force" —the
metabolism of the drug in the body — "however long a time [that] may occupy."
Midstate Horticultural Co., 306 U.S. at 166. In other words, it is a course of
conduct which the legislature intended to punish as one offense.
Because possession is a continuing offense, a defendant is subject to
prosecution in any county where possession or use is found. See Utah Code
Ann. § 76-1-202(1) (b) (West 2004) (providing that defendant may be tried in any
of the counties where "conduct constituting elements of [the] offense or results
that constitute elements . . . shall occur"). However, the user can only be
prosecuted once for the continuing possession or use, unless, of course, "the
possession was interrupted for some period of time or if it could be shown that
the defendant possessed [or used] discretely 'two or more quantities of a

-•n.

contraband drug/" Ingram v. State, 947 A.2d 74, 84 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008)
(citation omitted).4
B. The measurable amount provision is not an unconstitutional
"status" offense.
Defendant claims that the measurable amount provision is an unlawful
"status" offense under United States v. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Aplt. Brf. at
13. He contends that like the California law at issue in Robinson, Utah's
measurable amount provision prohibits "simply the status of having been
affected by a controlled substance at some previous time." Aplt. Brf. at 13. In
fact, Utah's measurable amount provision suffers from none of the
constitutional infirmities of California's "status" statute.
Robinson struck down a California provision which made it a criminal
offense for a person to "'be addicted to the use of narcotics/" Robinson, 370 U.S.
at 660 & n.l (quoting Cal. Health & Safety Code § 11721). California's addiction
provision did "not . . . punish[ ] a person for the use of narcotics, for their
purchase, sale or possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting
from their administration." Id. at 666, Instead, it criminalized the "illness" or
4

Defendant also complains that a person could be prosecuted in "in either
of two states" if he or she were to ingest drugs in Nevada and thereafter travel
to Utah. See Aplt. Brf. at 9-10. This possibility does not render the statute
unconstitutional. As observed by the Utah Supreme Court," [w]hen a defendant
in a single act violates the 'peace and dignity' of two sovereigns by breaking the
laws of each, he has committed two distinct 'offenses/' State v. Franklin, 735
P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1987).
_1A-

" status" of narcotics addiction, "for which the offender [could] be prosecuted at
any time before he reforms" and "even though he has never touched any
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there."
Id. at 666-67. The Court "h[e]ld that a state law which imprisons a person thus
afflicted as a criminal... inflicts a cruel and unusual punishment in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 667.
The provision at issue here is very different. Unlike California's addiction
law, Utah's measurable amount provision does not "authorize criminal
punishment for a bare desire to commit a criminal act." Robinson, 370 U.S. at
678-79 (Harlan, J., concurring). It criminalizes the actual "possession or use" of
narcotics. Indeed, the ongoing consumption of a drug in the body is the
quintessential use of that drug. It is at this stage of possession or use, as
opposed to holding the drug or merely introducing it into the body, that use is
most hazardous to the user and those around him or her.
Defendant suggests that penalizing a person who has an illegal narcotic in
his blood subjects the actor to continuous guilt. See Aplt, Brf. at 16-18. This
Court has also taken that view in dicta. See State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, ^f
20,106 P.3d 753, ajfd on other grounds, 2006 UT 17,133 P.3d 396. That is not the
case. The actor is guilty only during that period of time when the drug is being
consumed in his or her body, e.g., where methamphetamine is circulating in the

bloodstream and thus capable of affecting bodily processes. Even an addict
stops using for periods of time. And " drugs, like alcohol, are evanescent in a
person's blood system." State v. Flannigtm, 978 P.2d 127,129 (Ari. App. 1998)
(reciting testimony of expert), cert, denied, 528 U.S. 1074 (2000). For example,
methamphetamine — the controlled substance found in defendant's blood — has a
mean elimination half life of between 10.1 and 12.2 hours, depending on the
manner in which the drug was taken. Drugs and Human Performance Fact
Sheets - Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine), U.S. Dep't of Transportation: Nat'l
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) at 62 (April 2004) (Addendum
B). The overall effects of the drug "typically last 4-8 hours" and the residual
effects "can last up to 12 hours." Id.
In this case, defendant was actively using and under the influence of
methamphetamine, as evidenced by the presence of methamphetamine in his
blood and his behavior. And whether he introduced the substance into his body
in Utah or elsewhere, the State of Utah has a legitimate and substantial interest
in preventing persons from using the drug, e.g., being under the influence of the
drug in Utah. See State v. Brown, 440 P.2d 909,910-11 (Ariz. 1968) (holding that a
law prohibiting persons from being under the influence of a drug do not violate
Robinson).

Defendant repeatedly argues that the measurable amount provision is an
unconstitutional status offense because "once the person has ingested [illegal
drugs]. . ., there is nothing that that person can do to change his status of having
the illegal substance in his body or being addicted thereto, except to wait for
nature to take its course." Aplt. Brf. at 16; accord Aplt. Brf. at 17 (complaining
that "once [he] had ingested the controlled substance ..., there was nothing he
could do to conform with the law at the time of his arrest"). Defendant
apparently relies on Robinson's description of California's addiction provision as
an offense "'for which the offender may be prosecuted at any time before he
reforms.'" Aplt. Brf. at 12 (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666). Reliance on that
language, however, is misplaced.
Six years after Robinson, the Supreme Court addressed the issue in Powell
v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968), a case challenging a public intoxication law. The
Court in Powell flatly rejected the suggestion "that Robinson stands for the . . .
principle that' [c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being
in a condition he is powerless to change.'" 392 U.S. at 533 (quoting id. at 2171
(Fortas, J., dissenting)).

The Court observed that "there is a substantial

definitional distinction between a 'status,' as in Robinson, and a 'condition,'"
such as public intoxication.

Id. at 533-35. The Court thus rejected the

proposition that "a person in the 'condition' of being a chronic alcoholic cannot

-17-

be criminally punished as a constitutional matter for being drunk in public/7 Id.
at 536.
C

Utah's consumption statute does not violate the Utah
Constitution.
Defendant also claims that Utah's consumption statute violates the due

process and uniform operation of laws provisions of the Utah Constitution. See
Aplt. Brf. at 19-22. Those claims likewise fail.
1. Defendant's state due process claim is inadequately briefed.
Defendant contends that the measurable amount provision violates state
due process because once the methamphetamine was introduced into his body,
"there [was] nothing [he] could do to conform his actions to the requirements of
the 'consumption' statute/' Aplt. Brf. at 19-20. He contends that if state due
process under article I, section 7 "is to mean anything beyond notice and a
hearing, it has to mean that a person cannot be prosecuted and convicted for
something beyond his ability to control/7 Aplt. Brf. at 20. This is the sum and
substance of Defendant's state due process argument.
Defendant's state due process claim is inadequately briefed. Indeed, his
due process claim is " 'devoid of any meaningful analysis.'" State v. Garner, 2002
UT App 234, % 12,52 P.3d 467 (citation omitted). He cites Swayne v. LD.S. Social
Services, 795 P.2d 637, 642 (Utah 1990), and Ellis v. Social Services Dep't of the
Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 615 P.2d 1250,1256 (Utah 1980), but
-1S-

fails to explain the issues addressed in those cases or how their holdings support
his claim.5 Utah appellate courts have repeatedly "require[d] not just bald
citation to authority but development of that authority and reasoned analysis
based on that authority." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299,305 (Utah 1998); Garner,
2002 UT App 234, 1f 12 (same). Where, as here, a party fails to provide that
analysis, the "reviewing court will not address [those] arguments." Thomas, 961
P.2dat305.
In any event, the measurable amount provision is "rationally related to a
legitimate state interest" and does not, therefore, violate due process. Gardner v.
Board of County Commissioners of Wasatch County, 2008 UT 6, ^f 33,178 P.3d 893.
As recognized in Robinson, "'[tjhere can be no question of the authority of the
state in the exercise of its police power to [not only] regulate the administration,
sale, [and] prescription... of dangerous and habit forming drugs," but also "to
regulate . . . [their] u s e / " Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664 (citation omitted). Whether
or not the drug was injected in Utah, the State has a legitimate interest in not
permitting persons to be under the influence of illicit drugs while in the State.
As explained above, the circulation of a drug in the bloodstream is the
5

Swayne and Ellis recognize that where the putative father of an
illegitimate child in a parental termination case does not file a notice of
paternity, as required by statute, "due process requires that he be permitted to
show that he was not afforded a reasonable opportunity to comply with" that
notice requirement. Ellis, 615 P.2d at 1256; accord Swayne, 795 P.2d at 642 (same).
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quintessential use of that drug, for it is there where the drug affects the bodily
processes. Utah's provision thus "represents the measured application of
legislative tools to a real problem and is therefore constitutional under article I,
section 7." Judd v. Drezga, 2004 UT 91, | 31,103 P.3d 135.
2. The measurable amount provision does not violate Utah's
guarantee of the uniform operation of laws.
Defendant also claims that the consumption statute violates the uniform
operation of laws provision of article I, section 24, of the Utah Constitution.
Aplt. Brf, at 20-22. He contends that "the law does not apply equally to all
people within [the] class" of drug users, because some users, depending on
body size, individual metabolism, or type of drug, will be subject to prosecution
for longer periods of time. Aplt. Brf. at 21. This claim lacks merit.
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted a two-part test in determining
whether a statute violates the uniform operation of laws provision:
"First, a law must apply equally to all persons within a class.
Second, the statutory classifications and the different treatment
given the classes must be based on differences that have a
reasonable tendency to further the objective of the statute."
State v. Merrill 2005 UT 34, ^ 33,114 P.3d 585 (quoting Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d
661, 670 (Utah 1984)). Contrary to Defendant's claim on appeal, Utah's
possession statute satisfies this test.

.90.

As observed by the Utah Supreme Court in Merrill," [t]he first component
of [the test] presupposes that the statute creates classifications, casting its net
over some persons based on their status or conduct while excluding others/' Id.
at \ 34. Utah's possession statute classifies persons based on their possession or
use of controlled substances.

It reaches only those who possess or use

controlled substances without a valid prescription or order. It excludes those
who do not use or possess controlled substances, or do so pursuant to a valid
prescription or order.

Within the class of unlawful users generally, the

possession statute has uniform application: all are subject to criminal sanctions.
The possession statute does create sub-classifications that are subject to
different penalties, depending on the type or amount of the controlled
substance. For example, possession or use of a Schedule I or II drug is a third
degree felony, and possession of marijuana ranges from a class B misdemeanor
to a second degree felony, depending on the amount possessed. See Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (West Supp. 2009). These classifications, however, represent a
legitimate legislative judgment of the seriousness of each. They thus "have a
reasonable tendency to further the objective of the statute/' Merrill, 2005 UT 34,
If 33.
Defendant argues that because marijuana remains in the body longer than
does cocaine, heroin, or methamphetamine, "the legislature has effected a
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classification treating marijuana use more harshly than the use of other
controlled substances, even though it is clearly the legislatively-enacted policy
of this State that marijuana use is a less serious violation/7 Aplt. Brf. at 22.6 That
is not true. Although a marijuana user may be subject to criminal liability for a
longer period of time, he or she is still guilty of only a misdemeanor; the cocaine
or methamphetamine user is guilty of a felony. And in each case, the user is
guilty of the offense only so long as the drug remains in the body. Even
assuming, arguendo, that prolonged presence of a drug in a particular user's
body creates a classification, that classification is reasonably related to the
prolonged effects of that drug on the user. Therefore, Defendant's uniform of
operations of law claim fails.
D. The evidence was sufficient to support Defendant's bindover.
Defendant complains that the State did not introduce any evidence
showing that he knowingly and intentionally used the drugs. A review of the
evidence introduced at the preliminary hearing reveals otherwise.
At the preliminary hearing, the State was required to present evidence
sufficient to support a "reasonable belief that Defendant knowingly and
6

Defendant has cited no authority supporting his claim that marijuana
remains in the body much longer than other drugs. See Aplt. Brf. at 22. In
addressing Defendant's legal argument, the State will assume that Defendant's
factual assertion is true. However, the State does not concede that factual
allegation absent supporting authority.
oo

intentionally had a measurable amount of a controlled substance in his body.
See State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, If 16,20 P.3d 300. It met that burden. Not only did
the evidence establish that Defendant had methamphetamine in his system, it
also established that he had cocaine in his system. See R. 133: 10. Police also
found a syringe that tested positive for heroin in a black bag that Defendant
admitted contained some of his belongings. R. 133: 9,19. xAnother syringe was
found underneath the backseat of the car he was driving, and still another fell
off the lap of one of his companions. See R. 133: 21-22. Moreover, Defendant
admitted to using heroin earlier that day. See R. 133:17-18, 24. This evidence,
viewed together, was more than sufficient to support a reasonable belief that
Defendant's methamphetamine use was knowing and intentional. See State v.
Beckstead, 2003 UT App 115U (observing that defendant's admission to knowing
and voluntary possession of marijuana was evidence of knowing and voluntary
possession of methamphetamine). 7

Defendant also complains that the State did not introduce any evidence
showing the location where Defendant ingested the drugs. Aplt. Brf. at 16-17.
But as discussed, the statute permissibly includes the ongoing consumption of
drugs in the body, not just the ingestion or introduction of drugs into the body.
As explained, the presence of methamphetamine in the blood demonstrates that
methamphetamine use is ongoing. Where that use began is of no moment.
Possession or use by having a measurable amount of the drug in the
bloodstream is a continuing offense, and therefore, Defendant is subject to
prosecution in any county where the elements of the offense are satisfied. See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-202(l)(b). The evidence established his use in Lehi, Utah.
See R. 133: 6.
-23-

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted October 21, 2009.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

J ^ R E Y S. GRAY

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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ADDENDUM A

FILED
Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING RE: DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH BINDOVER

Plaintiff,
v.

Case No. 071403284

CHANCE ROBINSON,
Judge Fred D. Howard
Defendant.

This matter comes before the Court on a motion to quash bindover filed by Defendant
Chance Robinson ("Defendant"). Defendant filed his motion and a supporting memorandum on
August 19, 2008. On September 2, 2008, the State filed a memorandum in opposition. The
Court heard oral argument on September 8, 2008. The Court took the matter under advisement.
Having reviewed the parties' briefs, being fully advised in the premises, and good cause
appearing, the Court now makes the following Ruling.
RULING
On August 10, 2007, Defendant was pulled over for having no insurance on his vehicle.
While stopped, an officer thought Defendant was exhibiting signs of drug use. The officer asked
Defendant to perform several field sobriety tests. Defendant failed the field sobriety tests and
was arrested for DUI. A toxicology report indicated that methamphetamine was present in the
1

blood of Defendant. The Court bound over the charge for methamphetamine possession on July
29, 2008.
Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover regarding count four of the information,
a violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i), possession or use of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine). Defendant's motion argues that the statute as it reads is unconstitutional
and contradicts the United States Supreme Couil decision of Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660 (1062) (holding that criminal liability for the status of being a drug addict is
unconstitutional). Defendant asserts that status offenses are unconstitutional and argues that the
offense charged is a status offense and therefore unconstitutional requiring the bindover to fail
on count four.
The State of Utah opposes Defendant's motion and argues that the statute does not
criminalize a status within the meaning of Robinson. The State asserts that the statute is
distinguishable from Robinson because it does not make the addiction to methamphetamine
illegal, it makes the possession or use of a drug illegal.
In Robinson, the Supreme Court argues that status crimes are unconstitutional because
they punish a person who has not acted but merely has the proclivity towards committing a
crime. Robinson, 370 U.S. 660, 666. Robinson was convicted under a California statute that
made it illegal to be addicted to drugs. Id. at 661. At trial, it was undisputed that Robinson was
not under the influence of drugs or suffering from withdrawal. Id. The Court was concerned that
under the statute a person could be guilty of a crime whether or not they ever actually used or
2

possessed drugs within the state of California Robinson, 370 U S at 666 This was one of the
reasons why the Supreme Court struck down the California statute as being unconstitutional Id
Courts have continually had to distinguish various types of offenses to determine if
they are status crimes Neither crimes of DUI nor crimes of public intoxication have been
held to rise to the level of status offenses New Jersey v Margo, 191 A 2d 43 (New Jersey
1963) An individual may be punished based on their prior consumption of alcohol if they
are in public, either walking or driving, and have the requisite blood alcohol content Powell v
Texas, 392 US 514, 532 (1968) In Powell, the Court found that public drunkenness does not
fall under the umbrella of status crimes because the voluntary acts of drinking and then going out
into public Id Courts focus on the voluntary nature of the crime by determining if there was an
overt act by the defendant which makes it a crime rather than simply a desire for the criminal
behavior
The circumstances in this case are more similar to a public intoxication crime than to the
status offense of being a drug addict m Robinson Defendant chose to ingest the drugs He had
the choice of throwing them away or destroying them prior to ingesting them However, once he
made the choice to ingest the drugs and drive, he also made the choice to be prosecuted for drug
use or possession because it "may create substantial health and safety hazards, both for the
[defendant] and for members of the general public" Powell, 392 US 514, 532 The Court notes
the circumstantial evidence presented by the State that Defendant was driving a vehicle which

3

raises the reasonable inference that Defendant ingested the drugs voluntarily. The Court
determines that the bindover was proper as there is some evidence that Defendant voluntarily
ingested methamphetamine in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2)(a)(i).
Respectfully, the Court denies Defendant's motion to quash the bindover. Counsel for
Plaintiff is directed to prepare an order consistent with this Ruling.
DATED this / ^ day of September, 2008.

4
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Introduction
The use of psychoactive drugs followed by driving has been an issue of continual concern
to law enforcement officers, physicians, attorneys, forensic toxicologists and traffic
safety professionals in the U.S. and throughout the world. At issue are methods for
identifying the impaired driver on the road, the assessment and documentation of the
impairment they display, the availability of appropriate chemical tests, and the
interpretation of the subsequent results. A panel of international experts on drug-related
driving issues met to review developments in the field of drugs and human performance
over the last 10 years; to identify the specific effects that both illicit and prescription
drugs have on driving; and to develop guidance for others when dealing with drugimpaired driving problems.
This publication is based on the deliberations of the International Consultative Panel on
Drugs and Driving Impairment held in Seattle, WA in August 2000. This meeting was
sponsored by the National Safety Council, Committee on Alcohol and other Drugs; the
State of Washington Traffic Safety Commission; and the National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration. Delegates represented the fields of psychopharmacology,
behavioral psychology, drug chemistry, forensic toxicology, medicine, and law
enforcement experts trained in the recognition of drug effects on drivers in the field. The
Fact Sheets reflect the conclusions of the Panel and have been designed to provide
practical guidance to toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys
and the general public on issues related to drug impaired driving.
Sixteen drugs were selected for review and include over-the-counter medications,
prescription drugs, and illicit and/or abused drugs. The selected drugs are
cannabis/marijuana, carisoprodol, cocaine, dextromethorphan, diazepam,
diphenhydramine, gamma-hydroxybutyrate, ketamine, lysergic acid diethylamide,
methadone, methamphetamine/amphetamine, methylenedioxymethamphetmaine,
morphine/heroin, phencyclidine, toluene, and Zolpidem.
The Fact Sheets are based on the state of current scientific knowledge and represent the
conclusions of the panel. They have been designed to provide practical guidance to
toxicologists, pharmacologists, law enforcement officers, attorneys and the general public
to use in the evaluation of future cases. Each individual drug Fact Sheet covers
information regarding drug chemistry, usage and dosage information, pharmacology,
drug effects, effects on driving, drug evaluation and classification (DEC), and the panel's
assessment of driving risks, A list of key references and recommended reading is also
provided for each drug. Readers are encouraged to use the Fact Sheets in connection with
the other cited impaired driving-related texts.
The information provided is uniform for all the Fact Sheets and provides details on the
physical description of the drug, synonyms, and pharmaceutical or illicit sources; medical
and recreational uses, recommended and abused doses, typical routes of administration,
and potency and purity; mechanism of drug action and major receptor sites; drug
absorption, distribution, metabolism and elimination data; blood and urine
concentrations; psychological and physiological effects, and drug interactions; drug
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effects on psychomotor performance effects; driving simulator and epidemiology studies;
and drug recognition evaluation profiles. Each Fact Sheet concludes with general
statements about the drugs' ability to impair driving performance. The authors strongly
believe that all the above information needs to be taken into account when evaluating a
drug.
Case interpretation can be complicated by a number of factors and one of the main
limitations of the Fact Sheets is that they primarily relate to single drug use. Other factors
which influence the risk of effects on driving for any drug include the dose, the dosage
frequency, acute and residual effects, chronic administration, route of administration, the
concentration of the drug at the site of action, idiosyncrasies of metabolism, drug
tolerance or hypersensitivity, and the combined effects of the drug with other drugs or
alcohol, to name but a few.
Individual Fact Sheets
Cannabis/Marijuana
Carisoprodol (and Meprobamate)
Cocaine
Dextromethorphan
Diazepam
Diphenhydramine
Gamma-Hydroxybutyrate (GHB, GBL, and 1,4-BD)
Ketamine
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD)
Methadone
Methamphetamine (and Amphetamine)
Methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA, Ecstasy)
Morphine (and Heroin)
Phencyclidine (PCP)
Toluene
Zolpidem (and Zaleplon, Zopiclone)
Lead Authors:
Fiona Couper, Ph.D. and Barry Logan, Ph.D.
Main contributors:
Michael J Corbett, Ph.D., Laurel Farrell, BS, Marilyn Huestis Ph.D., Wayne Jeffrey, BS,
Jan Raemakers Ph.D.
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Other delegates to the consensus conference:
Marcelline Burns, Ph.D.; Yale Caplan, Ph.D.; Dennis Crouch, BS, MBA; Johann De
Gier, Ph.D.; Olaf Drummer Ph.D.; Kurt Dubowski, Ph.D.; Robert Forney Jr., Ph.D.;
Bernd Freidel, M.D.; Manfred Moeller, Ph.D.; Thomas Page, BA; Lionel Raymon,
Pharm.D., Ph.D., Wim Riedel, Ph.D.; Laurent Rivier, Ph.D.; Annemiek Vermeeren,
Ph.D. and H. Chip Walls BS. Other participants included James F. Frank, Ph.D. from the
NHTSA Office of Research & Technology; Sgt. Steven Johnson of the Washington State
Patrol; Capt. Chuck Hayes of the Oregon State Patrol; and Sgt. Douglas Paquette of the
New York State Police.

Disclaimer
The information contained in the Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets represents
the views of the contributors and not necessarily those of their place of employment or
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
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Methamphetamme (and Amphetamine)
Methamphetamme hydrochloride is a white to light brown crystalline powder, or clear
chunky crystals resembling ice Methamphetamme base is a liquid
Synonyms: Methamphetamme chalk, chrissy, crank, crystal, glass, go, hydro, ice, meth,
rock candy, speed, whiz, Desoxyn®, Amphetamine dextroamphetamine, Dexedrme®,
Adderall®, Benzedrine®, DextroStat®, Biphetamme®, Giadumet®
Source: The majonty of street methamphetamme is produced m clandestine laboratories
(e g reduction of /-ephedrme or d-pseudoephednne over red phosphorus with hydroiodic
acid, or 1 eduction with sodium or lithium m condensed liquid ammonia)
Methamphetamme remains concentrated m western U S states and some rural areas
elsewheie d-Methamphetamme is a schedule II controlled substance (Desoxyn®)
a\ailable m 5 mg white, 10 mg pink, and 15 mg yellow strength tablets Amphetamine is
also a Schedule II controlled substance and is usually supplied as the sulfate salt of the dlsomer (Dexedrme®), or as the racemic mixture (Benzedrine®), or a mixture of the two
(Adderall®) Dexedrme® is available m 5, 10, and 15 mg strength, orange/black
capsules, or 5 mg tablets Adderall® is available m 5, 7 5, 10, 12 5, 20, and 30 mg
strength, blue or orange tablets
Drug Class: CNS stimulant, sympathomimetic, appetite suppiessant
Medical and Recreational Uses: Medicinally, methamphetamme is used m the
treatment of narcolepsy, attention deficit disordei (ADD), and attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) Typical doses aie 10 mg/day or up to 40 mg daily, and a
course of greater than six weeks is not recommended Methamphetamme is infrequently
used m the treatment of obesity, overeating disorders, and weight loss due to its abuse
potential Amphetamine is also used m ADD, narcolepsy and weight control
Recreationally, methamphetamme is abused to increase alertness, relieve fatigue, control
weight, tieat mild depression, and for its intense euphoric effects
Potency, Purity and Dose: Purity of methamphetamme is currently very high, at 6090%, and is predominantly d-methamphetamme which has greater CNS potency than the
/-isomer or the racemic mixture Common abused doses are 100-1000 mg/day, and up to
5000 mg/day m chionic binge use Therapeutic doses of Desoxyn® are 2 5-10 mg daily,
with dosing not exceed 60 mg/day To treat narcolepsy, 5-60 mg/day of amphetamine is
ingested m divided doses, and in ADD and ADHD doses of 2 5-10 mg/day is
administered, depending on age
Route of Administration:
Methamphetamme users often begin with intranasal or oral
use and progress to mtiavenous use, and occasionally smoking In contrast to cocaine, the
hydrochloride salt of methamphetamme can itself be smoked Methamphetamme is used
sometimes with alcohol or manjuana, particularly during the withdrawal phase
Pharmacodynamics: Methamphetamme increases synaptic levels of the
neuiotransmitters dopamine, serotonin (5-HT) and norepmephnne, and has a and (3
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adrenergic agonist effects. Norepinephrine is responsible for methamphetamine's
alerting, anorectic, locomotor and sympathomimetic effects; dopamine stimulates
locomotor effects, psychosis, and perception disturbances; and 5HT is responsible for
delusions and psychosis. Methamphetamine's effects are similar to cocaine but its onset
is slower and the duration is longer. Racemic amphetamine and d-amphetamine have
similar chemical properties and actions to methamphetamine but are less potent.
Pharmacokinetics: Following oral administration, peak methamphetamine
concentrations are seen in 2.6-3,6 hours and the mean elimination half-life is 10.1 hours
(range 6.4-15 hours). The amphetamine metabolite peaks at 12 hours. Following
intravenous injection, the mean elimination half-life is slightly longer (12.2 hours).
Methamphetamine is metabolized to amphetamine (active), p-OH-amphetamine and
norephedrine (both inactive). Several other drugs are metabolized to amphetamine and
methamphetamine and include benzphetamme, selegeline, and famprofazone.
Molecular Interactions /Receptor Chemistry: Methamphetamine is metabolized to
amphetamine via cytochrome P450 2D6. Potential inhibitors of the 2D6 isoenzyme could
decrease the rate of methamphetamine elimination if administered concurrently, while
potential inducers could increase the rate of elimination.
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: 0.65 (N=l).
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: Blood concentrations can generally be used to
distinguish therapeutic use from abuse. Concentrations of 0.02-0.05 mg/L are typical for
therapeutic use, and up to 0.2 mg/L have been documented. Concentrations greater than
this represent abuse. Concentrations do not disclose phase of use. Normal concentrations
in recreational use are 0.01 to 2.5 mg/L (median 0.6 mg/L). Concentrations above this
range will likely be associated with severe, possibly life threatening, toxicity. There is no
evidence for improved performance in any task or test following use of doses greater than
40 mg (or concentrations greater than 0.2 mg/L).
Peak blood methamphetamine concentrations occur shortly after injection, a few
minutes after smoking, and around 3 hours after oral dosing. Peak plasma amphetamine
concentrations occur around 10 hours after methamphetamine use.
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Positive results generally indicate use within 1-4
days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use. Rate of excretion into the
urine is heavily influenced by urinary pH. Between 30-54% of an oral dose is excreted in
urine as unchanged methamphetamine and 10-23% as unchanged amphetamine.
Following an intravenous dose, 45% is excreted as unchanged parent drug and 7%
amphetamine.
Effects: Methamphetamine effects are less intense after oral ingestion than following
smoked or intravenous use.
Early phase - Psychological: Euphoria, excitation, exhilaration, rapid flight of ideas,
increased libido, rapid speech, motor restlessness, hallucinations, delusions psychosis,
insomnia, reduced fatigue or drowsiness, increased alertness, heightened sense of v/ell

-62-

being, stereotypes behavior, feelings of increased physical strength, and poor impulse
control.
Early phase - Physiological: Increased heart rate, increased blood pressure, increased
respiration rate, elevated temperature, palpitations, irregular heartbeat, dry mouth,
abdominal cramps, appetite suppressed, twitching, pallor, dilated pupils, HGN at high
doses, faster reaction time, increased strength, and more efficient glucose utilization.
Late phase - Psychological: Dysphoria, residual stimulation, restlessness, agitation,
nervousness, paranoia, violence, aggression, lack of coordination, pseudo-hallucinations,
delusions, psychosis, and drug craving.
Late phase ~ Physiological. Fatigue, sleepiness with sudden starts,
itching/picking/scratching, normal heart rate, and normal to small pupils which are
reactive to light.
Binge use of methamphetamine can be broken down into the following phases:
Rush - (5 minutes) intense euphoria, rapid flight of ideas, sexual stimulation, high
energy, obsessive/compulsive activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Shoulder (1 hour) less intense euphoria, hyperactivity, rapid flight of ideas, obsessive/compulsive
activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Binge use - (1-5 days) the drug is frequently
readministered in an attempt to regain or maintain euphoria; Tweaking - (4-24 hours)
dysphoria, scattered and disorganized thought, intense craving, paranoia, anxiety and
irritability, hypervigilance, auditory and tactile hallucinations, delusions, and normal
pupils; Crash - (1-3 days) intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and catnapping,
continuing stimulation, drug craving; Normal - (2-7 days) apparent return to "normalcy"
although drug craving may appear; Withdrawal - anergia, anhedonia, waves of intense
craving, depression, hypersomnolence, exhaustion, extreme fatigue.
Side Effect Profile: Light sensitivity, irritability, insomnia, nervousness, headache,
tremors, anxiety, suspiciousness, paranoia, aggressiveness, delusions, hallucinations,
irrational behavior, and violence. In overdose, symptoms may include hyperthermia,
tachycardia, severe hypertension, convulsions, chest pains, stroke, cardiovascular
collapse, and possible death. Other common side effects following abuse of
amphetamines include viral hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), HIV,
septicemia, abscesses, collapsed blood vessels, and malnutrition. Chronic abuse generally
produces a psychosis that resembles schizophrenia and is characterized by paranoia,
picking at the skin, preoccupation with one's own thoughts, and auditory and visual
hallucinations. Violent and erratic behavior is frequently seen among chronic abusers.
Over time, methamphetamine appears to cause reduced levels of dopamine, which can
result in symptoms like those of Parkinson's disease.
Duration of Effects: Onset of effects is rapid following intravenous use and smoking,
while effects onset more slowly following oral use. Overall effects typically last 4-8
hours; residual effects can last up to 12 hours.
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effect: Methamphetamine has a high potential
for abuse and dependence. Tolerance may develop and users may quickly become
addicted and use it with increasing frequency and in increasing doses. Abrupt
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discontinuation of use can produce extreme fatigue, mental depression, apathy, long
periods of sleep, irritability, and disorientation.
Drug Interactions: Phenobarbital, propoxyphene, phenytoin and MAOFs slow the
metabolism of amphetamines and increases their effect on the release of norepinephrine
and other monoamines from adrenergic ner\e endings. Amphetamines may counteract
sedative effects of antihistamines. Methamphetamine may restore ethanol induced
impairment in simple repetitive tasks of short duration, however, there is no restoration of
ethanol-induced deficits of balance and steadiness. In general, high doses of
amphetamines are likely to increase the impairing effects of alcohol. Chlorpromazine and
haloperidol block dopamine and norepinephrine reuptake, thus inhibiting the central
stimulant effects of amphetamines. Amphetamine potentiates the analgesic effect of
meperidine.
Performance Effects: Laboratory studies have been limited to much lower doses than
those used by methamphetamine abusers. Doses of 10-30 mg methamphetamine have
shown to improve reaction time, relief fatigue, improve cognitive function testing,
increase subjective feelings of alertness, increase time estimation, and increase euphoria.
However, subjects were willing to make more high-risk choices. The majority of
laboratory tests were administered 1 hour post dose. Expected performance effects
following higher doses may include agitation, inability to focus attention on divided
attention tasks, inattention, restlessness, motor excitation, increased reaction time, and
time distortion, depressed reflexes, poor balance and coordination, and inability to follow
directions.
Effects on Driving: The drug manufacturer states that patients should be informed that
methamphetamine and amphetamine may impair the ability to engage in potentially
hazardous activities such as driving a motor vehicle. In epidemiology studies drive-offthe-road type accidents, high speed, failing to stop, diminished divided attention,
inattentive driving, impatience, and high risk driving have been reported. Significant
impairment of driving performance would also be expected during drug withdrawal. In a
recent review of 101 driving under the influence cases, where methamphetamine was the
only drug detected, blood concentrations ranged from <0.05-2.36 mg/L (mean 0.35 mg/L,
median 0.23 mg/L). Driving and driver behaviors included speeding, lane travel, erratic
driving, accidents, nervousness, rapid and non-stop speech, unintelligible speech,
disorientation, agitation, staggering and awkward movements, irrational or violent
behavior, and unconsciousness. Impairment was attributed to distraction, disorientation,
motor excitation, hyperactive reflexes, general cognitive impairment, or withdrawal,
fatigue and hypersomnolence.
DEC Category: CNS stimulant.
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze nystagmus not
present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size dilated; reaction to light slow; pulse
rate elevated; blood pressure elevated; body temperature normal to down. Other
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characteristic indicators may include restlessness, body tremors, talkativeness,
exaggerated reflexes, anxiety, and track marks or recent injection sites.
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: At lower dose, amphetamines have few effects on
cognitive functioning and may result in an enhancement of some psychomotor tasks, but
risk-taking increases at higher doses and responses become inappropriate. Drug
withdrawal could also lead to the impairment of psychomotor skills required for safe
driving.
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